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Abstract 
In 1993 and 1994, two manned investigations were canied 
out on the NLR moving base Research Flight Simulator 
(RFS), concerning several aspects involving the use of an 
advanced forward-looking windshear detection system in 
the final approach phase of a flight. 
In the first (1993) experiment, three windshear detection 
systems were evaluated separately, or in combination, 
together with three specific flight procedures, without 
presenting any weather (or windshear) information to the 
crew on a weather type of display. The three systems 
evaluated consisted of functional models of: a reactive 
windsbear detection system, a non-scanning LIght Detection 
And Ranging (LIDAR) forward-looking windshear 
detection system, and a ground-based Terminal Doppler 
Weather Radar (TDWR) system. With the latter a ground- 
to-air data-uplink connection to the aircraft cockpit was 
simulated. 
To assess the safety aspects involved, a safety risk model 
was developed. The model and experiences gained with it 
will be described. Furthermore, final results and 
conclusions of the 1993 piloted experiment are presented. 
In the second (1994) experiment described, a reactive and 
a scanning forward-looking LIDAR system were evaluated. 
The latter produced coloured windshear icon information on 
an EFIS/NAV display, using two different concepts. The 
flight procedure evaluated, was coupled to a systems 
integrated threat-level based windshear alerting concept. 
Pending a full data analysis, only some preliminruy results 
and conclusions of this second experiment are given. 
AGL 
AT 
AVO 
CDU 
CRT 
DB 
DLR 
EFIS 
EICAS 
FAS 
FD 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
Above Ground Level 
Auto throttle 
All Weather Operations 
Central Display Unit 
Cathode Ray Tubes 
Downburst 
Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fiir Luft- und 
Raumfarht e.V., Germany 
Electronic Flight Instrument System 
Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System 
Final Approach Speed or Flight deck Alerting 
System 
Flight Director 
FH Flight Hazard 
FHF Flight Hazard Factor 
GARTEUR Group for Aeronautical Research and 
Technology in Europe 
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System 
ILS Instrument Landing System. 
JAR Joint Airworthiness Regulations 
LIDAR LIght Detection And Ranging 
LLJ Low-Level Jet 
KLM The Royal Dutch Airlines 
KNMI The Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute 
MAC Mean Aerodynamic Cord 
MCCP Manual Crew Coordination Procedures 
MERS Mental Effort Rating Scale 
NAV NAVigation (display) 
NIVR Netherlands Agency for Aerospace Programs 
NLR National Aerospace Laboratory, the Netherlands 
NM Nautical Miles 
ONERA Office National d'Etudes et de Recherches 
Airospatiales, France 
PF Pilot Flying 
PFD Primary Flight Display 
PNF Pilot Not Flying 
POD Probability Of Detection 
RFS Research Flight Simulator 
RLD Netherlands Department of Civil Aviation 
TDP Touch Down Point 
TDWR Terminal Doppler Weather Radar 
WTA Windshear Training Aid 
Notations not exolained in the main text 
A,, 4 body specific forces 
- 
eke, unit vector aligned with laser beam 
h,, Radio altitude 
V, V,, Groundspeed 
V, Final Approach Speed 
V,, Reference speed 
V,, True airspeed 
W, longitudinal wind component; tailwind positive 
W, vertical wind component; downdraught positive 
a,a,,, (stall) angle of attack 
1. Introduction 
Windshear, defined as a deterministic change in wind 
velocity and/or wind direction, remains a concern in aircraft 
safety. There's no guarantee that aircraft performance will 
be sufficient to cope with the energy loss resulting from a 
windshear. Its danger should not be underestimated, as 
numerous accident and incidents have shown and the best 
advice is to avoid it. 
Early 1996, the first forward-looking windshear 
detection systems have become commercially available to 
the airline c~mmuni t~")~ '~)~ '~ ' .  Enhanced (or upgraded) 
Doppler weather radar systems like AlliedSignal/Bendix- 
King's RDR-4B, RockwelllCollins' WXR-700X and the 
new MODAR 3000 radar of Westinghouse will enter the 
market. The market entry of these new products concludes 
a period of activities aimed at reducing the accident and/or 
incident rate related to windshear. This period started with 
the introduction of the Windshear Training Aid (WTA) 
Program in 1987'4), and led in 1990 to a mandate of the 
FAA (see FAR 5 121.358'5') which demanded certain types 
of aircraft to have a windshear detection system installed 
before 31st December 1993. However, some operators e.g. 
North West, American Airlines and Continental Airlines, 
were granted an extension to 31 December 1995 (under 
exemption 5256), to acquire technical and operational 
experience with the new types of forward-looking 
windshear detection systems that were still under 
development at that moment. Technical issues such as 
ground clutter suppression and reliable detection of so- 
called "dry" windshear (e.g. windshear with very low radar 
reflectivity characteristics) had to be overcome. The fact 
that these systems have now received full type certification 
'n).c7).cR), proves that these problems have been solved 
satisfactory in the eyes of the regulation authorities. 
However, apart from a reliable detection of the dangerous 
weather phenomenon, also issues such as integration within 
the Flight deck Alerting System (FAS)'" and the 
establishment of proper flight operations (procedures) had 
to be faced. Despite the fact that the Industry-proposed and 
implemented solution(s) have been accepted by the 
regulation authorities, these latter issues still need attention 
and further improvement. 
In 1993 and 1994, The National Aerospace Laboratory 
NLR performed two piloted simulator trials regarding 
issues described above and will perform a third evaluation 
in mid 1996. The major part of these activities were 
performed under contracts of the Netherlands Agency for 
Aerospace Programs (NIVR) and the Netherlands 
Department of Civil Aviation (RLD). 
ICAS paper 7-1.3"'" already presented a full description and 
some initial results of the 1993 experiment. This paper 
presents the final results of the first simulator experiment 
and will repeat some important aspects of the experimental 
set-up for sake of completeness. Furthermore it will address 
the second (1994) experiment but only preliminary results 
are presented, as final results are pending a full data 
analysis. 
2. The Research Flight Simulator (RFS) 
Both experiments were canied out on the moving-base 
Research Flight Simulator (RFS) of NLR. This simulator 
consists of a side-hy-side cockpit mounted on a four- 
degrees-of-freedom motion system (pitch, roll, yaw and 
heave), see Fig.1. The full-glass cockpit has a total of six 
cathode ray tubes (CRTs) and two central display units 
(CDUs) comparable with a level of sophistication of the 
Boeing 747-400 cockpit, see Fig.2. Outside view is 
generated by a model-board television system with images 
collimated at infinity. 
3. Models used 
3.1 Aircraft model 
A fullv non-linear model of a four-engined, heavv weight 
- . - 
transport aircraft was simulated. The model includes delay 
in engine spool-up time responses, and effect of flap and 
gear setting on aerodynamic performance. The aircraft 
equations of motions were updated at 20 Hz. Aircraft 
parameters used in the experiment were based on the 
maximum landing weight configuration of 285800 kg, with 
a centre of gravity at 25% MAC. 
3.2 Windshear models 
The windshear models that have been developed and 
were used during the experiments were a downburst (or 
microburst) m~del'~"', a low-level jet model'"' and another 
"neutral" shear model. To account for the atmospheric 
boundary layer effect, the windshear models were mixed 
with a boundary layer model. Due to real-time restrictions 
in the calculation process of the pulsed fonvard-looking 
windshear detection system, a three dimensional spatial grid 
in the area of the runway was developed on which the wind 
data generated by the above models were stored. Above a 
certain reference height the grid data was integrated with 
pre-stored tabled wind data. This table data only contained 
horizontal wind profiles as a function of height. All 
windshear models produced stationary (Earth-fixed) wind 
fields. 
In the 1993 experiment, three versions of each windshear 
model were used. The "neutral" shear model for example 
produced either a light headwind change, a light crosswind 
change or a severe crosswind change. 
In the 1994 experiment, the windshear could, if detected by 
the forward-looking sensor, be visually observed on the 
EFISNAV display. In order to prevent the crew from 
recognizing the windshear many more windshear versions 
were used. These were categorized in classes of severity 
(not extremeljust extremelextreme) and threat position 
(threat1 no threat) with respect to relative distance between 
centre of the shear cell and the runway centre line. 
3.3 Turbulence model 
To investigate the effect of turbulence on overall crew 
and system performance, the NLR Non-Gaussian turbulence 
model'14' was used and enhanced. The model features 
intermittency, patchiness, influences of altitude and 
windspeed on scale length and intensity, and "abovelbelow 
clouds" effects. To account for the anisotropical interplay 
(effect) between windshear and turbulence, the suggestion 
by Woodfield and Woods'15' was followed to add a fraction 
of the absolute value of the veaical wind component into 
the various turbulence intensities. The general expression 
for the rms intensiy of the turbulence velocities was 
defined as: 
where u,, v, and w, are wind components. The parameter 
values c and d were varied as function of the desired 
turbulence intensity level: 
c=O , d=O 'no' turbulence 
c=0.1 , d=0.03 'light-to-moderate' turbulence 
c=0.13 , d=0.07 'moderate-to-severe' turbulence 
3.4 Windshear detection system models 
3.4.1 Reactive system 
The reactive windshear detection system model 
developed has been based on information from a simple 
Sundstrand system"''. The reactive system is engaged 
automatically below 1500 ft AGL. The reactive system alert 
logic in the first experiment was based on an F-factor 
calculation in aircraft wind axes, with the F-factor defined 
as: 
The instantaneous F-factor of Eq.(2) was used to calculate 
the averaged F-factor F, (averaged in time), which is 
defined in the Technical Standard Order (TSO-117)"" as: 
with T, being the filter time window. If the calculated 
averaged F-factor exceeded some specified limits a 
"CAUTION" or a "WARNING" alert was generated in the 
cockpit and remained present for at least three seconds. A 
"CAUTION" would be given in case of a performance 
increasing situation. A "WARNING alert was given when 
the aircraft encountered a severe performance loss. It is 
noted that in the 1994 experiment not Eq.(2) but Eq.(3) was 
used in the averaging process. 
3.4.2 Forward-lookin. windshear detector 
As forward-looking sensor a functional model of a CO, 
lidar (laser) was developed. The laser beam could be 
stabilized in three ways, viz. a) fixed in the airframe, b) 
pitch-stabilized, and c) Right path angle-stabilized. The 
mode of laser beam stabilization was an experimental 
variable. During the 1993 experiment no scanning mode 
was provided, i.e. the beam was aligned within the 
longitudinal plane. To calculate the windshear hazard from 
the laser the laser F-factor derived by Bowles'l" was used: 
In its mechanisation the vertical wind component (WA was 
deleted and not estimated by other means. The Doppler 
speed V,,,,,,, includes horizontal as well as vertical wind 
components, and was calculated from the dot product 
where Vr is the inertial speed vector, and where @ is 
where L,  and L, are height-dependent scale factors to the windspeed vector. The F-factor for the laser also is 
reduce nuisance effects at low altitude. This is a systems averaged in a manner similar to Fa,, by taking an equivalent 
equivalent of the well known equation for F"": spatial in te~at ion along the laser beam, as follows: 
general be incorporated within a ground proximity warning 
Fhmm(r) = -!- Fher(x) dx (7) system (GPWS). To enhance operational realism a GPWS 
R" r-R,  model has been defined, based on general information of 
SUNDSTRAND's Mark VII GPWS"" including six modes 
out of the existing seven modes. The seventh mode, a 
The distance variable r runs from a minimum range value windshear detection, annunciation and alerting mode, was 
R,,, determined by system parameters, to a maximum replaced by an in-house-defined mode which regulated the 
range %=,,, where the maximum range is limited by priority between the six modes of the GPWS, the reactive 
precipitation andlor the presence of the ground. The windshear system alerting and the forward-looking 
distance R, and filter time T, are related by: windshear detection system alerting possibilities. 
Three levels of filter time T,, or distance &, were used in 
the 1993 experiment. 
In the 1994 experiment the laser was enhanced with a 
scanning mode such that it could generate in real time the 
necessary information to present windshear icons on an 
E F I S M  display. These icons would both present the 
position, threat and area coverage of the windshear. 
Multiple icons could be present, indicating more than one 
cell. Icons were all of a circular form and were connected 
to an alert logic. 
3.4.3 TDWR svstem 
For the sound-based detection svstem a functional 
model of the Terminal Doppler weather Radar (TDWR) 
was developed. Because of real-time problems with the 
simulator software this functional model could not be 
implemented in time, and hence the effect of this sensor on 
the alert was used instead. Therefore the time when the 
warning would occur was varied randomly. Three "levels" 
were foreseen, viz. 'early', 'timely' and 'late'. These 
values, or labels, were associated with an altitude range, 
based on range from touchdown, where the TDWR alert 
occurred with a uniform probability of occurrence within 
the altitude interval, see Table 1. 
Table 1 TDWR probability of detection (POD) 
4. Alerting aspects 
TDWR POD 
'early' 
'timely' 
'late' 
4.1 Windshear alerting and other aural alerts 
Both visual and aural alerts were generated in accordance 
with the requirements of the FAA"R'."Y', and were provided 
to the crew. Visual windshear alerts depend upon the type 
of windshear sensor detecting the windshear, and consisted 
of either a label "WINDSHEAR" or "WINDSHEAR 
AHEAD" presented on the lower c.q. upper part of an 
EFISIPFD, or both labels simultaneously. 
The labels were generated both for "caution" or "warning" 
alerts. Cautions were presented in amber colour, while 
warnings were presented in red colour, both for the 
airborne reactive and forward-looking windshear detection 
. 
system. 
A master cautiodwarning buttonnight in front of the pilot 
flying, located near the top of the instrument panel, was 
also illuminated if an airborne windshear alert occurred. 
The light could be reset by pressing the button. 
Aural windshear alerts were given by a computerized voice 
through the cockpit speakers calling out the words 
"WARNING (or "CAUTION) WINDSHEAR" in case of an 
alert from the reactive system, or the words "WARNING 
(or "CAUTION) WINDSHEAR AHEAD" in case of a 
forward-looking system alert. It was given in three 
subsequent cycles for warnings, but in only one cycle in 
case of a caution. If windshear alerts were generated by the 
simulated TDWR system a warning sound (chime) would 
trigger the pilot's attention and a data-link message was 
presented on the lower EICAS panel. Three different 
formats, with increasing information content, were used, 
viz. 
Format A: "TDWR alert" 
Format B: "TDWR alert" 
"Position ..nm from threshold. 
Format C: "TDWR alert" 
"Position ..nm from threshold 
"Max wind change ..ktsM 
height range 
(ft) 
1000 - 2000 
500 - 1000 
0 - 500 
Other aural cues to the crew consisted of engine sounds, 
protection warnings (like stick shaker, outer and middle 
3.5 Ground Proximity Warning Svstem (GPWS) model marker beacon sounds, and call-outs belonging to the six 
A reactive windshear detection system model will in modes of operation of the GPWS. 
distance from 
touchdown 
(nm) 
3.14 - 6.28 
1.57 - 3.14 
0 - 1.57 
4.2 Aural alerting priority 
An aural priority schedule was defined and implemented 
which gave overall priority to the windshear alerts. 
In order of highest priority the sequence of aural alerts was 
given by: 
1) Reactive windshear system alert above forward-looking 
windshear alert 
2) Highest windshear alert (threat) level 
3) GPWS Modes 1 through 6 
4) Other (system) alerts, e.g. TDWR data-uplink alerts 
5.2 Conduct of the 1993 experiment 
Three crews participated in the experiment. Of each 
crew, both members acted as Pilot Flying (PF). The total 
experiment was subdivided per crew into two sets of 5 
trials each, distributed over two days. The trials were 
devoted to a single sensor or set of windshear sensors, with 
the no sensor cases as the experiment baseline, see Table 
2. Furthermore, each crew was given two out of three 
procedures to follow, as it would be too difficult for the 
crews to be trained for three different types of flight 
procedures. 
5. 1993 Experiment 5.3 Procedures 
5.1 Experimental factors 
In view of the objectives the following number of 
experimental variables were defined: 
a) flight procedure (l="safety first", 2="cautious", 
3="daringN). See explanation below. 
b) type of windshear detection sensor (No sensor, 
reactive system, forward-looking laser, TDWR, or 
the combination of an airborne with the TDWR 
sensor); 
c) type of windshear (neutral, low-level jet, downburst) 
d) turbulence level (no, moderate, severe) 
e) critical F-factor level F,,, (-0.08, -.lo, -0.15). 
f) allowed speed change AV for the critical F-factor 
(10, 20, 25 kts)."' 
g) type of laser beam stabilization (body pitch, along 
speed vector, inertial pitch). 
h) precipitation (0 mm/hr, 15 m d h r ,  50 mm/hr), 
or equivalently a maximum effective range of the laser 
of 8000 m, 3300 m or 1500 m. 
i) TDWR probability of detection POD ('Early', 
Timely', 'Late', see Table 1). 
j) the TDWR data uplink format. (Format A,B or C) 
Table 2 Experiment trials versus sensor configuration 
Sensor 
no sensor 
(baseline config.) 
.......................... 
reactive system 
.......................... 
laser system 
.......................... 
TDWR system 
sensor mix 
5.3.1 Approach procedure 
In both experiments only approaches were studied. 
Each approach was initiated at a distance of 13 nm (24 km) 
from the runway threshold, 2 nm (3704 m) left of the 
extended centre line of the runway at an intercept heading 
of 30 deg of the final approach course at an altitude of 
2000 ft (610 m). The aircraft was stabilized and trimmed 
for a horizontal flight condition with an indicated airspeed 
of 205 kts, flaps set at 10 degrees and landing gear 
retracted. The pilots were instructed to perform Cat.1 
approaches (with a Decision Altitude of 188 ft) and to 
execute a normal landing approach, according to normal 
operational practice and normal safety standards, thereby 
applying the Manual Crew Coordination Procedures 
(MCCP). The Final Approach Speed (FAS) used, was 156 
kts (Vref + 5 kts). 
The pilot not flying (PNF) performed the ATC 
communication and assisted the PF in his flying task, 
according to the MCCP. The crew had to fly the 
approaches manually, but use of the autothrottles was 
allowed. Furthermore the crew was assisted in ILS-tracking 
by a flight-director (FD). This FD, however, was not 
designed to give windshear guidance commands in the 
experiment of 1993. Because of this, the FD had to be 
disregarded if a go-around was initiated in case of a 
windshear situation. 
5.3.2 Go-around procedures 
The crew was given two options as to the type of go- 
around to perform, viz. the standard, normal go-around 
(normally involving configuration changes), or the 
Windshear Training Aid (WTA) go-around (no change of 
configuration). This latter type had to be adhered to 
whenever there was a reactive system windshear alert, or 
when the crew felt they were actually in a windshear. In 
other cases they were left free to choose which procedure 
they would follow. 
5.4 Flight procedures evaluated 
Three flight procedures were tested. They consisted of 
applying some speed increment(s) and to initiate a go- 
around, in case of one or more windshear warnings, 
depending upon altitude, see Table 3. 
Table 3 Speed increments and flight procedures 
speed 
type of increment to V,, flight 
warning proc. 
above below 
500' 500' 
single GA GA safety first 
15 20 cautious 
15 20 daring 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - ------- ---- - 
doublet GA G A safety first 
multiple 20 G A cautious 
20 20 daring 
The following flight procedures were tested: 
1) safety first: a go-around had to be made at any time 
there was a RED alert (i.e. a WARNING). 
2) cautious penetration: When there was a first RED 
alert from any windshear sensor during the approach above 
500 ft, the flight speed had to be increased to V,,+15 kts, 
or immediately to V,,+20 kts when below 500 ft, and the 
approach continued. If a second RED alert (from any 
warning system) was generated above 500 ft then the speed 
had to be increased further to V,,+20 kts. For any 
(remaining) second RED alert below 500 ft, a go-around 
had to be made. 
3) darinx penetration: the flight speed had to be 
increased to V,,+15 kts when there was any RED alert 
above 500 ft. If a first RED alert occurred below 500 ft, 
speed also had to be set to V,,+20 kts. If a second RED 
alert (from any other warning system) was generated either 
above or below 500 ft, then speed had to be increased to 
V,,+20 kts. This procedure tended to drive the crew 
towards continuing the approach at a fairly high speed, 
rather than abort and make a go-around. 
5.5 Data collection 
5.5.1 Pilot subiective data 
After each run the crew had to fill out a questionnaire. 
Both the pilot flying and the pilot not flying had to answer 
questions related to situational awareness. The pilot flying 
furthermore had to answer questions related to piloting 
effort to maintain speed, track the ILS, etc., and also had 
to rate his (mental) workload using a subjective (ordinal) 
(mental) effort rating scale (MERS).'"'. After the 
experiment a debriefing questionnaire had to be filled in 
and a discussion was held. 
5.5.2 Measured data 
Sixty four parameters were recorded at a frequency of 20 
hz and stored on magnetic tape. Afterwards statistical 
parameters such as the mean, the root mean squares (rms), 
the standard deviation, the mean deviation and minimum 
and maximum values were calculated for 3 defined 
se,gnents: 
- se-ment 1 (Upper ILS): ILS altitude between 1500 and 
500 ft, or moment of making a go-around; 
- se-ment 2 (Lower ILS): ILS altitudes between 500 and 
50 ft, or moment of making a go-around; 
- se,ment 3 (Go-around segment): from the moment of go- 
around initiated until the moment of go-around altitude 
capture. 
Due to the long runway length available, landing distance 
would not create an operational problem. The landing 
se-gnent (4) defined, consisted of touchdown criteria only. 
To this purposes data was recorded at certain specific 
events. The most important were: 
- passage of the 1500', IOOO', 500', 250', 100' and 50' ft 
altitudes (based on distance-to-go to runway touchdown 
point); 
- the moment of'touchdown; 
- the moment the go-around button was depressed; 
- the moment a windshear sensor alert was generated. 
5.6 Data analysis 
The data obtained in the experiment were analyzed in 
several ways. For instance an ANOVA (= ANalysis Of 
VAriance) was applied on all statistical segment measures, 
pilot questionnaire data and on data of some events. 
Furthermore, parametric and non-parametric tests, e.g. the 
F-test c.q. the Kruskal-Wallis test, were performed where 
appropriate. 
Concerning the statistical analysis, the following levels of 
statistical significance (p) were defined: 
- weakly significant: p< 0.10 
- significant: p< 0.05 
- highly significant: p< 0.01 
5.7 Safety assessment 
In order to be able to evaluate the effect of windshear 
sensors, type of windshear and flight procedures tested, on 
the safety of operation, a number of variables were 
analyzed. Furthermore, two different methods were used for 
analysis purposes: 
- a factor analysis 
- a probability analysis (Bayesian approach) 
Both methods will be explained below. 
5.7.1 Safety investigation usinr! Factor analvsis 5.7.2 Safety analysis using the Bayesian approach 
The question of flight safety is a hard one to answer. In The followiug general probability rules apply for a 
order to obtain some measure of flight safety in a Bayesian approach: 
windshear environment, the following list of 11 variables 
was assumed to play a role in flight safety: PGUY) = P(% +PW -P(x~Y) 
1. pilot perceived windshear hazard (subjective measure) 
2. maximum angle of attack, or stall margin (relative to 
stall angle of attack) per flight 
3,4 minimum and maximum pitch angle during the flight 
5. minimum airspeed per flight 
6. minimum inertial speed during flight 
7 .  minimum (i.e. worst) F-factor of the flight. 
8. minimum (i.e. worst) Fa,-factor during flight 
9.10 minimum and maximum vertical acceleration during 
the flight 
11. minimum energy height margin (difference between 
actual and a reference value) 
Note that for each variable only one value was obtained per 
measurement run (total flight), i.e. over all se-ments 
involved. 
Several of the variables were correlated, i.e. if one varied, 
so did the other. The information contained within the 
correlation matrix was used by factor analysis to determine 
which independent factors, or groups of variables, were 
"hidden" within the set of variables given. When applying 
factor analysis to the variables given above, it turned out 
that only one independent factor was needed to describe the 
various effects. This factor has subsequently been named 
'Flight Hazard' (FH). The factor loadings upon the 
variables included were determined. In case of normal- 
ization, these loadings also are the correlation coefficients 
between the factor and the variables. From inspecting these 
loadings it became clear that perceived windshear hazard, 
maximum minus minimum pitch angle (i.e. the peak-to- 
peak pitch change), minimum stall margin, minimum 
airspeed, minimum F,, and the peak-to-peak vertical 
acceleration change were the greatest contributors to FH. 
The smallest absolute loading was on minimum energy 
height margin. 
So the above given 11 variables could be replaced by a 
single factor (FH), which is one of the advantages of 
applying factor analysis. The 'flight hazard' was further 
transformed into the 'Flight Hazard Factor' by using the 
minimum and maximum value of FH, and scaling between 
zero and one. When denoting flight hazard factor by 'FHF', 
then the following formula was applied: 
Some results with the 'FHF will he given 
with 
Here P(XuY) is the probability on the union of event X or 
Y, P(XnY) is the probability on the intersection of both 
events and P(X1Y) is the conditional probability of event 
X, given that event Y has occurred. If there is no 
dependence in probability between event X and Y, then 
P(X1Y) = P(X). In that case P(XnY) becomes P(X).P(Y). 
The question of safety has been subdivided into flight 
safety and landing safety. Concerning the flight runs made 
in this experiment, the following definition of the probabil- 
ity of an unsafe event is given: 
P(A) = Probability of event A (11) 
where the following events are defined: 
A = unsafe events during the run 
A, = unsafe events during the flight portion of the run 
A,, = unsafe events during the landing portion of the 
run 
GA = event of making a go-around during the run; 
the adjoint event is a. 
Per definition one has the following relationship: 
Using the probability theory the total probability of an 
unsafe event during each run can be stated as: 
P(A) = ~ ( A f l m  U AflGA) 
= ~ ( ~ f l m )  + P(AnGA) (13) 
The statement above means in fact: 
the probability of an unsafe event during a run is 
equal to the probability of an accident d~iring the run, 
given that no go-around has occurred, 
OR 
the probability of an unsafe event during a run, given 
that a go-around has been made. 
-14- 
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In case of a go-around, the probability of an unsafe event 1) angle of attack a i a,. This relates to the risk of 
during the run, is made up of the flight portion only. In stalling the aircraft, which is defined as a crashworthy 
case of a landing (no go-around) both the flight and landing condition. In this paper the angle-of-attack margin is 
portion are included. This implies that the conditional taken, i.e. urn,* = ad-a >O ; 
probabilities in Eq.(13) can be rewritten. 2) height above terrain h>O. Obviously this relates to the 
I) for the approaches resulting in a go-around it is found risk of hitting the ground. Because of the generally 
that: large trend (i.e. monotonic increase) in this variable, 
while 
11) for the approaches ending in a (safe) landing: 
(14)(a) the standard deviation became quite large, and therefore use of the standard deviation became 
unsuitable for probability calculations. Therefore 
height was used for the go-around segment flight 
probability calculations and negative glideslope 
(14)(b) deviations were used instead for the non go-around 
cases; 
3 airspeed Va>Va,,. Whenever the airspeed exceeds a 
maximum, there is a risk of parts flying off the 
Note that Eq.(l4b) describes the sum of the flight part and aircraft or damage due to aerodynamic overload. For 
the landing part. Substituting the above two equations into the aircraft type used this speed has been set 10 kt 
Eq.(13) yields the total run probability: above the flap 30 limit speed of 180 kts, 231 kts with 
where obviously we have that P(A,,) is the landing safety 
risk and P(A,) is the flight safety risk. The latter is given 
by: 
Eq.(16) shows that flight safety includes both the safety 
considerations during the approach part of the flight as well 
as the go-around part. Landing safety in Eq.(15) is only 
related to the safety at moment of touchdown, although 
normally also the safety during the roll-out after landing 
should be included. 
The probability P(=) was calculated per category of 
interest, e.g. for the safety-first flight procedure flying on 
a downburst, etc. The conditional probabilities were 
calculated per run using the mean and standard deviation 
of those variables which were involved in the risk of an 
unsafe event, together with the normal probability 
distribution of these variables. It was assumed that on the 
respective segments the variables of interest were normally 
distributed, with a mean and standard deviation as 
determined per segment per run. Data inspection revealed 
that this assumption was not too severely violated. 
Numerical limits were defined in order to calculate the 
probability of an unsafe event. 
5.8 Numerical limits for flight safety analysis 
It was hypothesized that the following variables, 
conditions, etc. were important concerning the risk of an 
unsafe event during the flight part of a run: 
(15) flaps 20 (go-around condition), and 238 kts for flaps 10 decrees: 
- .  
4) vertical acceleration 4. Whenever the vertical 
acceleration exceeds a maximum (or minimum) there 
is a risk of structural damage. Extreme values set in 
the report are +2.5 g and -1 g (flaps up), and +2.5 g 
and -0.5 g with flaps extended; 
5) negative glideslope deviation A&,,. This condition 
was used instead of the height above terrain for the 
approach phase of the flight. Maximum negative ILS 
glideslope deviation is set at -2 dots, for the approach 
phase only, for the go-around segment this parameter 
was not used. 
5.9 Numerical limits for landing safety analysis 
According to JAR/AW0'2"', the following variables 
contribute to landing safety: 
* the longitudinal and lateral coordinates x, and yTD 
relative to the touchdown point. When certain values are 
exceeded then the aircraft is likely to land left or right of 
the runway (ly,l > yTDami,), or land too long (x, > 
x,) with the risk of runway overrun, or land too 
short (x, < x,,,~,), with the risk of landing before the 
runway; 
* pitch angle at touchdown 0,. When 0, > +1Io then a 
tail strike occurs. If 0, < 0" then a different limit applies 
for the sink rate as the aircraft will then be landing on its 
nosewheel first; 
* sinkrate at touchdown w, ,,. When the sinkrate at 
touchdown is too high then there is a risk of failure of 
the landing gear, depending on the pitch angle at 
touchdown. With a negative pitch angle at touchdown the 
landing will be made on the nosewheel first, and in that 
case a lower sink rate limit applies; 
* groundspeed at touchdown V,,. When the groundspeed Table 4 Distribution of number of landings and go 
is too high there is a risk of tire failure, or else runway arounds over crews and fllght procedures 
overrun or wheel brake overheating; 
* angle-of-attack c ~ ,  at touchdown. This provides the 
margin to stall angle. Too low a value indicates the risk 
of a hard landing; 
* bank angle at touchdown cp,. When the bank angle 
exceeds a certain limit value there is the risk of engine 
pod strike (for the aircraft type used), with consequent 
damage and the risk of fire; 
* lateral velocity or sideslip angle for structural limit 
loads. Since the aircraft flown may be landed with 
lateral forces on the landing gear (due to crabbed 
landings) this criterion has not been incorporated. 
After some iterations the following limit values were set 
and used in calculating P(A,) in Eq.(15): 
* -1000 ft < x, <+3800 ft 
* I Y , ~  < 21 m 
Flight Procedure 
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* 8, < 11" to prevent a tail strike when landing. 
* sinkrate w, < 1000 ft/rnin (5.08 m/s) if 8, 2 0'; 
and w, < 600 ftfmin if 8, < 0' (i.e. for a 
nosewheel landing) 
* VGs < 203 kts (max. tire speed) 
* a,,,, > 0" 
* lcp,l < 8.5". This value was taken from a 
geometrical drawing to provide engine pod 
clearance with the s o u n d  when banking the aircraft 
More details about the probability calculation process and 
limit values per segment are given in Appendix A. 
5.10 Final results of the 1993 experiment 
5.10.1 Basic facts 
A total of 180 experimental runs (approaches) were 
flown, an average of one third through downbursts, but no 
crashes occurred. A distribution of the number of landings 
and go arounds of all the experimental runs over crews and 
flight procedures is given in Table 4. 
As can be observed, 127 landings were made against 53 
go-arounds (70.6% versus 29.4%). The number of landings 
increased from about 14% (26 cases) for the 'safety first' 
flight procedure (procedure 1) to about 30% for flight 
procedure 3. This is a trend that could be expected since 
the 3rd ('daring') flight procedure allowed the crews to 
continue the approach the farthest. 
However, both landings and go-wounds should be reviewed 
on their safety, as kil l  be shown later. 
5.10.2 Distribution of eo-mounds 
Fig.3 and Fig.4 present histograms of the distribution of 
the number of go-arounds (and landings) over flight 
procedure, windshear type and windshear sensor type. 
Note: L=Landing; G=Go-around 
If compared between the types of windshear, Fig.3 shows 
that most of the go-arounds were made for the downburst 
(DB) cases, as expected. For the 3rd ('daring') flight 
procedure; no go-arounds were made in case of a low-level 
jet (LLJ) or a neutral (N) type of shear, but only if a 
downburst was encountered. Fig.4 shows that no landings 
were made with either the reactive system or the laser 
(lidar) in case of a downburst and the safety first flight 
procedure. 
Fig.5 presents the go-around distribution as function of the 
altitude se-gnents along the glideslope. There were 4 cases 
(73%) above 1500 ft AGL, but these cases were found to 
be due to an incorrect execution of the flight procedure 
evaluated. Furthermore, 94,3% (or 50  cases) was initiated 
before 100 ft AGL (with even 77,4%, or 41 cases, before 
decision height of 200 ft AGL) and still 5,7% (3 cases) 
below 50 feet AGL. A peak amount of 20 (37,7%) go- 
arounds was initiated between 1000 and 500 ft AGL. This 
result can be explained from Fig.6, where the average go- 
around position before the runway touchdown point (TDP) 
is presented as function of the flight procedure applied. 
Clearly, go-arounds with the 'safety first' flight procedure 
were initiated (on average) the fartherst from the runway 
TDP, or equivalently at the higher altitudes, while with the 
'daring' flight procedure go-arounds were executed nearest 
to the runway TDP. In the latter case (with 20 kts speed 
increment), it was more often possible to overcome the 
windshear and to continue the approach. If a go-around was 
initiated, it was generally the result of a destabilized final 
approach and not of the windshear alerts, hence it was of 
the standard type. 
5.10.3 Type of go-around 
Since the pilots had an option (in case of a forward- 
looking windshear alert) to apply either the WTA or the 
Standard go-around manoeuvre, it was tried to identify if 
from a statistical point of view there was a pilot preference 
to either one of these procedures. However, statistical 
significance of main effects was difficult to determine, due 
to the fact that go-arounds were not made under all 
combinations of sensors, windshear types and flight 
procedures tested. 
Fig.7 presents the average distance to runway TDP for both 
types of go-around. On average the standard type of go- 
around was made at lower altitudes than the WTA type of 
go-around. When analyzing the types of go-around for 
dependency of the flight procedures involved, then Fig.8 
shows a statistically highly significant result (p=0.0087) if 
the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test is applied. It shows 
that with the 'safety' first flight procedure, the pilots 
adhered more to the WTA type of go-around than with the 
'daring' flight procedure. With this latter flight procedure 
most of the go-arounds were of the standard type. 
However, only six go-arounds were made with the 'daring' 
flight procedure (see Table 4). 
For the 'cautious' flight procedure the division over both 
types of go-around was almost equal. 
Apart from the flight procedure, also the various sensor 
types involved turned out to be a statistically significant 
factor for the type of go-around executed. Unexpectedly, 
Fig.9 shows that the WTA procedure was applied more 
often with the laser sensor onboard the aircraft, with 
TDWR or with sensor mix alerts, than with the reactive (or 
no) sensor configuration. The reason, in case of a reactive 
sensor, why not all go-arounds were of the WTA type (as 
briefed) must be found in the fact that sometimes go- 
arounds were made, after having passed a shear, due to 
destabilized approach on (very) short final. 
The results presented above can be further explained from 
the pilot comments. Those revealed that pilots preferred to 
adhere to one type of windshear go-around procedure 
(irrespective of the sensor alert or flight procedure 
evaluated), as they regarded windshear as a once-in-a- 
lifetime experience. Therefore they mostly stuck to the 
WTA type of go-around procedure if initiated after any 
windshear alert given and allowed by the flight procedure. 
So, even in the case of the forward-looking sensor alerts, 
when there generally was more lead time before the shear 
would be entered, the WTA was executed. However, the 
lack of windshear situational awareness (no weather andlor 
windshear information was presented other than the wind 
vector on the EFISMAV display) is expected to be a factor 
that has contributed to this result, because pilots did not 
know how long it would take before they would actually 
enter the shear. 
5.10.4 Safety calculation aspects 
As some cases resulted in a go-around instead of a 
landing, the comparison base for safety has to be the 
safety risk calculated both for the group of cases that led to 
a landing or to a go-around. For the go-around cases the 
calculated total safety risk was split up into a risk 
calculated for the flight part until moment of go-around 
initiation and a go-around part. For the landing cases the 
total safety risk was composed of the sum of the flight 
safety risk (flight part) and the landing safety risk 
(touchdown safety risk). 
5.10.4.1 Risk drivers 
Figures 10 to 13 present the main contributors to the 
flight and landing safety risk calculations along the various 
se,gnents defined. Remarkably, a very significant risk 
driver was found in the probability of exceeding the flap 
limit speeds, as represented by VG,, in all flight se,gnents, 
but especially in the go-around segment. Other drivers were 
the risk to exceed the -2 dot glideslope deviation (as 
expected), and the risk to encounter too negative g-loads 
(AZ,~,). Furthermore the angle of attackmargin (a,,,) was 
of relatively higher importance during the go-around than 
during the other se,gnents. Landing safety was mainly 
determined by the risk to land short of the runway 
touchdown point (xTDmi,) and the risk to exceed a bank 
angle of -8 degrees (@,,), i.e. left wing down. The risk to 
exceed +8 degrees (@,,) differed from @,, due to the fact 
that low-level crosswinds mostly came from one direction 
in the experiment. 
5.10.4.2 Flizht safety 
Statistically, the f l i ~h t  safety differed siznificantlv with 
- - 
the type of windshear and the flight procedure applied, 
while the type of windshear sensor had no significant 
effect. 
Fig.14a shows both the calculated flight safety risk and the 
Flight Hazard Factor, i.e. P(A,J and FHF, as a function of 
the windshear type, for the landing approaches only. Flying 
in severe windshear (downburst) circumstances clearly 
formed the highest risk. Note that the FHF, although on a 
different scale, follows exactly the same trend as P(A&. 
The values for the 20-around approaches are presented in 
Fig. l4b. Neutral shears and low-level jets formed an equal 
flight safety risk for the aircraft, although the FHF 
indicated a difference between both. However, the 
subjective measure (pilot perceived hazard) within the FHF 
is expected to be the reason for this as no other reason 
could be found. 
Although the effect is statistically not significant 
(p=0.1780), it can be seen from Fig.15 that the highest 
flight safety risk was encountered with the mix of sensors, 
while the highest FHF occurred in the no sensor case. The 
difference between both risk indicators could not be 
explained. However, supported by both indicators it can be 
seen that the safety was best (=lowest flight safety risk or 
FHF value) with a forward looking windshear detection 
system (laser) on board of the aircraft. 
If grouped as function of flight procedure, Fig.16a shows 
that for landing approaches, the 'daring' (most windshear 
penetrating) flight procedure had the highest risk. For the 
go-around approaches, see Fig.l6b, the 'cautious' flight 
procedure had the higest flight safety risk. The FHF 
indicates the same trend for landing aproaches. However, 
for the go-around cases, the 'daring' flight procedure was 
found to have the highest risk. The reason why this trend 
of the FHF deviates from the flight safety risk figure is 
again found to be in the pilot perceived hazard during the 
execution of a go-around. With the 'cautious' flight 
procedure, very often the core of a downburst had to be 
crossed, leading to occasionally a severe stall condition 
with a high altitude loss. Consequently, pilots rated the 
windshear hazard during these flights much higher than if 
no stall occurred. With the 'daring' flight procedure a lot 
of the windshear effect could already be overcome by the 
extra speed increments allowed and no severe altitude drops 
or stall situations occurred thus leading to lower hazard 
ratings. 
5.10.4.3 Go-around safety 
Fig.17 compares for the downburst cases only 
- 
(irrespective of the flight procedure), the flight safety risk 
for the go-around and the landing cases. As can be 
observed, both safety indicators follow the same, 
statistically very significant (p=0.0000), trend: 
Safety during go-around approaches was less if compared 
with continuing the approach. Again, it is noted that for the 
go-around cases, flight safety risk 'P(A&' is equal to the 
total safety risk. however, for the landing cases presented, 
the landing safety risk 'P(A,,)' is not included, so that in 
this figure we only compare safety on the flight segments! 
In the following the FHF will not be presented any more, 
as the pilot perceived hazard rating was a rating given for 
the total run and not for the approach, go-around or landing 
segment separately. The FHF seems a useful tool for safety 
assessment investigations, but it needs some refinement. 
Especially, it should include pilot hazard ratings per flight 
in order to better correlate with the safety risk 
parameters calculated. 
5.10.4.4 Landing safety 
Statistically, the following parameters were vely 
significant for differences in the landing safety risk ?(A,): 
the type of windshear, the flight procedure, the type of 
windshear sensors and the crews themselves. 
Unexpectedly, the landing safety risk was the highest for 
the low-level jet cases, as can be seen from Fig.18. This 
result can be explained from the fact that, at moment of 
touchdown, large bank angles occurred more often in case 
of low-level jets than with the other shear types. 
From Fig.19 it can be concluded that the landing risk for 
the 'cautious' flight procedure was significantly lower than 
for the other flight procedures. However, crews only flew 
two out of three flight procedures. As landing generally is 
a very complex and demanding task, especially in a 
simulator, it was no surprise therefore that crews turned out 
to be a factor in the landing safety risk calculated. Figure 
20 shows the results. Trends are not totally consistent 
especially for the 'daring' flight procedure. It was found 
that crew 3 generally landed (on average) 200 m longer on 
the runway than the other two crews, thereby increasing 
landing risk. It is possible that crew 3 over-compensated 
altitude, as they were rated on a Boeing 737 type of aircraft 
and not for a heavy-weight type of aircraft with a 
correspondingly larger size, as the other two crews were. 
Fig.21 presents the finding that any type of windshear 
sensor, or a mix of sensors, improved landing safety, if 
compared to the no sensor case. In the latter case, there 
would be no windshear alert given to increase the speed, so 
landings were generally made with (on average 2 kts) lesser 
groundspeed and only after having safely passed the shears. 
It is suspected that landing the aircraft with a slightly 
higher speed decreased control difficulty for the crews and 
made the effect of crosswinds less severe (less decrab and 
bank angle), thereby improving landing safety. Fig.21 also 
shows that the best safety improvement occurred for the 
reactive sensor, while the TDWR gave the smallest 
improvement. The way the TDWR functionality was 
modelled and implemented in the experiment is expected to 
be the reason for this latter result: in contradiction to the 
other sensor alerts, TDWR alerts were not generated via a 
realistic windshear sensing process, but via a random 
generation of different waming times as function of aircraft 
position. 
5.10.4.5 Total safety 
5.10.4.5.1 Influence of experimental factors 
If analyzed over all cases (landings and go-zounds), the 
total safety risk, 'P(A)' in Eq.15, was statistically 
significantly effected by windshear type and crews only. As 
can be observed in Fig.22, the highest risk occurred for the 
downburst cases, as expected. Unfortunately, crews turned 
out to be a statistically significant factor as well, 
F(3,104)=8.66, p<0.00035. Fig.23 shows the nesting of 
crews within flight procedure. For the 'cautious' flight 
procedure the differences between crew 1 and crew 3 were 
highly significant (pi0.000002). It is possible that this 
difference was due to differences in learning effects, as this 
flight procedure was the second one executed by the first 
crew, but it was the first procedure for the third crew. Also 
lack of experience in flying heavier types of aircraft may 
be a reason for this, as explained before. 
The type of windshear sensor turned out to have no 
significant main effect. However, the group consisting of 
the reactive and the laser sensor had a significantly lower 
total risk than the group consisting of the no sensor, the 
TDWR and the mix of sensors, see Fig.24. 
5.10.4.5.2 Total safety risk of landings and go-arounds 
The crews have the choice to either continue and land 
the aircraft, or to perform a go-around. Therefore total 
safety risk should be compared between these two 
situations, see Fig.25 for some results. As can be observed, 
apart form the 'safety first' flight procedure, the total safety 
risk in the go-arounds is always higher than for the landing 
cases. This will be explained later on. Note that in 
contradiction to the landing cases, the factor "flight 
procedure" is statistically not significant (p<.1220) for the 
go-around cases. However, the trend shown indicates an 
increased risk if the flight procedures allows to fly further 
into the shear with an increased speed. 
The total risk for the landing cases was found to be the 
lowest for the 'cautious' flight procedure, while the risk 
between the other two flight procedures hardly differed 
from each other. 
If all landing cases are compared against all go-around 
cases, then Fig.26 shows that the total risk of performing 
a go-around was much higher than to continue the approach 
(with a higher speed) and land the aircraft. This result was 
found extraordinary, difficult to understand and to explain. 
Therefore, a risk model sensitivity analysis was performed. 
It was found that the result was totally due to the high 
probability of exceeding the maximum flap operation 
speeds during the go-around segment. If this risk element 
was excluded from the risk model the result would look 
like Fig.27. This raises the question if the risk of exceeding 
this maximum flap operation speed(s) is really a serious 
danger to aircraft safety or not. Perhaps this parameter 
should not be judged equally severe as the other risk 
drivers and therefore a different weighting may be 
appropriate, when compared with the other risk drivers. 
Additional study is required to answer this question. 
Finally, as mentioned before, crews executed more 
frequently the Standard than the WTA type of go-around. 
When comparing the total safety risk of these two go- 
around types, the F-test showed, with F(1,14)=0.50 
p<.4899, that the WTA had a risk value of 0.0464, almost 
1.38 times lower (i.e. better) than the standard type of go- 
around. The risk value for the WTA type even dropped to 
0.00368 and the ratio increased to about 7.38, for 
F(1,14)=1.63 p<.2226, when the weighting on the 
maximum flap operation speed was set to zero. However, 
as indicated, the results are statistically non-significant. 
5.1 1 Some conclusions of the 1993 experiment 
The Bayesian risk model developed, although still to be 
improved, was found very suitable and useful1 for the 
intended risk assessment purposes. 
In terms of flight safety the laser sensor consistently had 
about a five times better (i.e. lower) risk, compared to the 
(no sensor) baseline case. There was no consistent 
improvement in flight safety found, when adding a reactive 
sensor to the aircraft. However, landine safety and total 
safetv were best with either the reactive or the laser sensor. 
No significant difference was found between these two 
types of sensors. Total safety risk was significantly higher 
for the approaches resulting in a go-around than for those 
resulting in a landing, although this result mainly depended 
on the risk to exceed the maximum flap operation speeds. 
If this factor is excluded from the risk model, it was safer 
to go-around than to continue the approach and land. For 
the two types of go-arounds that occurred (WTA or 
standard) no statistically significant difference in total 
safety risk could be found. 
Best overall flight procedure in terms of landing and total 
safety risk, pilot workload""' and reduction in go-around 
rate turned out to be the 'cautious' windshear penetrating 
flight procedure. 
5.12 Recommendations from the 1993 experiment 
Although the 'cautious' flight procedure came out best, 
it should be studiedmore deeply. Furthermore, the effect of 
adding a windshear display in the cockpit, to improve 
weather and situational awareness, should be investigated. 
Crews suggested to modify or improve the sensor-based 
alerting concept into a kind of sensor integrated threat-level 
alerting concept, as too many confusing alerts flooded the 
cockpit in the multiple sensor configurations evaluated. 
Also the position of the alerts labels on the EFISPFD 
should be reversed: reactive system labels on top and 
fonvard-looking system alerts labels on the bottom. In the 
future, pilots preferred to be assisted by a flight-director 
with a state-of-the-art windshear guidance mode, and if 
possible, based on integrated reactive and forward-looking 
windshear hazard (sensor) information. 
F.inally, the risk model should be improved. First of all by 
including a proper ground collision risk contribution for the 
go-around phase. Secondly a proper weighting of the risk 
to exceed the maximum flap operation speeds should be 
established. 
6. 1994 Experiment 
6.1 Experiment description 
The 1994 experiment was conducted by GARTEUR (= 
Group for Aeronautical Research and Technology in 
EURope) Flight Mechanics Action Group FM(AG07), 
consisting of ONERA (France), DLR (Germany) and NLR 
(The Netherlands). The European context was further 
emphasized by the participation of six crews of the nations 
involved. Per crew member a total of 27 runs, of which 7 
were familiarisation runs, were executed. So in total 240 
measurement runs were obtained. 
The experiment was split up into two parts. In the first sub- 
experiment a reactive and a forward-looking windshear 
detection system were tested separately. Besides, the effect 
of adding a flight-director with a windshear guidance 
during a windshear escape was tested. In this suh- 
experiment no windshear information was visually 
presented in the cockpit, other than the wind vector on the 
EFISNAV display. 
In the second sub-experiment, the effect of presenting 
windshear icon information on the EFISNAV-display was 
investigated. These icons were derived from the information 
obtained from a real-time scanning laser model. 
6.2 Threat-level based aural windshear alerts 
As a lesson learned from the 1993 experiment, a sensor 
integrated, threat-level based aural alerting concept was 
defined and evaluated. This implied that aural alerts would 
only be passed on after the threat-level detected increased 
to a new level. As no proper information was available 
during the experiment definition phase, a self-defined 
threat-level system was used in order to be able to integrate 
the aural alerting system, the alert labels presented on the 
EFISPFD and the windshear icon information presented on 
the map mode of the EFISNAV-display. The following 
hazard levels, from lowest to highest priority, were defined: 
Hazard level 0 = No hazard 
Hazard level 1 = Advisory alert 
Hazard level 2 = Caution alert 
Hazard level 3 = Caution (suppressed Warning) alert 
Hazard level 4 = Warning alert 
6.3 Threat-level determination 
With the reactive system the threat-level was determined 
by comparing the averaged F-factor, computed through 
Eq.(3) and Eq.(4), with critical limits defined. 
Using the forward-looking windshear detector, the threat 
level was determined, in real time, by an along beam 
averaged F-factor, calculated from a regression formula 
given by: 
This regression formula, established by a model fit to 
radar-determined data of actual rnicrobur~ts'~~', uses the 
peak-to-peak speed difference (AV,) divided by the 
distance between the peaks (Ar). 
In the regression analysis a sine wave model was used for 
a spatial approximation of the windshear effect over a 
length of one kilometre, including a vertical wind 
component estimation. The model assumes that all 
performance-decreasing shear occurs between the velocity 
peaks of the sine wave. It was found for almost all 
microbursts that Ar varied between 2 and 6.2 km, and the 
fit obtained showed a correlation coefficient of 0.999 (24'. 
For every scan cycle and for every windshear cell (vortex), 
the laser model determined the value(s) of AVD along the 
laser beam and the corresponding Ar according to: 
- A v ~  = V~a~pp~c , (mw)  ~onnp~er(min~ (18) 
The radius of the icon would be given by: 
using the along beam range points for the maximum and 
minimum Doppler speed derived. Finally, the calculated 
icon radius was used to determine Ar 
Ar = 2*ricon (20) 
In case of equal hazard levels, aural priority was given to Per windshear cell, the one-kilometre averaged laser F- 
reactive system alerts above forward-looking system alerts. factor (F,;,) was established and tested against critical F- 
To suit special intentions of FM(AG07), "Advisory" and factor levels to derive the hazard status, see Table 6. 
"Caution" alerts were both given in a performance It is noted that in the 1993 and 1994 experiments, both for 
decreasing windshear situation. Normally, Flight deck the reactive and the laser system, the F-factor definitions 
Alerting Systems, if related to windshear systems," 25' were such that negative F-values implied a decreasing 
define "Caution" alerts for performance increasing shears. aircraft performance. 
Table 5 presents the aural and visual alerts used in the 
1994 experiment. 
0 ... --- --- 
---------------- ---------------- --------- ..................... ...................... 
1 ADVICE . 1 f I W Z E S A R  1 WINDSHEAR 
---------------- ---------------- --------- ..................... ...................... 
2 "CAUTION..." WINDSHEAR WINDSHEAR 
AHEAD 
---------------- ---------------- --------- ..................... ...................... 
3 " "CAUTION ..." amber WINDSHEAR 
AHEAD ... 
Table 5 Aural alerts and EFISIPFD labels per system as function of the hazard status 
--------------- ---------------- --------- ..................... ..................... 
4 "WARNING ..." red WINDSHEAR WINDSHEAR 
AHEAD 
Notes: 1) Only used in case of a display, in order to suppress Warning alerts until icon moves from zone 
B into zone A. 
2) Aural messages following "ADVICE...", "CAUTION ..." or "WARNING ..." are identical to PFD 
text labels in 4th and 5th column and were announced in two subsequent cycles. 
Hazard Status 
Table 6 Hazard levels as function of 
critical F-factors 
Voice 2, 
6.4 EFISW-d i sp l ay  presented windshear icons 
When the scanning mode of the laserflidar detected a 
windshear ahead of the aircraft, a windsbear icon would be 
presented on the EFISNAV display. Sometimes multiple 
windshear cells were used, then multiple icons could occur, 
see Fig.29. Icons indicated the relative threat (hazard) of 
the windshear to the aircraft by their position, size and 
colour. The nearer the icon is to the intended flight path, 
the greater the windshear hazard on the aircraft and 
perceived threat by the pilot. Alert zones were defined to 
incorporate this effect. 
Label 
Colour 
level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6.5 Windshear icon display alert zones 
Based on information from a NASMndustry proposed 
c0ncept(2s.?6) , the following icon alert zones were defined, 
see Fig.28. Zone A is given by the region bounded by an 
arc with a radius of 1667 m (0.9 nm) and with a maximum 
azimuth angle of +. 25 degees, and two vertical lines, 
having 463 m (0.25 nm) lateral displacement on either side 
of the aircraft's longitudinal axis. Zone B is defined by a 
Critical 
F-factor 
> -.040 
between 
-.040 and -.I00 
between 
-.I00 and -.210 
< -.210 
< -.210 
plane with a radius that related to the 4 nm maximum 
detection range of the laser (or about 8 krn) and with a 
maximum azimuth angle of t 4 5  degrees relative to the 
same longitudinal axis. Zone B excluded sector A. 
If one or more icons were infringing alerting zone B or A, 
then the icon with the highest threat-level determined would 
trigger the FAS. To prevent too many unnecessary go- 
arounds from being initiated while still having time to 
undertake action, any 'warning' hazard outside sector A 
would be presented to the crew in the form of combined 
amberlred circles (implying a hazard level 3). In this way 
it was made clear to the crew that the windshear already 
possessed the most severe threat to the aircraft, but that 
PFD label of 
Laser system 
there was still time to monitor the icon (dynamics) on the 
display, to assess circumstances and to negotiate about 
possibilities to solve the safety endangering situation. 
However, the moment a (still) amberlred icon moved into 
alert sector A, it would be coloured fully red and the FAS 
would revert to hazard level 4, producing an aural warning 
alert, see Tables 5 and 7. Any warning (red) alert implied 
a direct go-around initiation. 
PFD label of 
Reachve system 
6.6 EFISPFD presented windshear labels 
Whenever a windshear sensor detected a windshear of a 
certain hazard level, windshear labels were presented on the 
EFISIPFD, see Fig.30 and Tables 5 and 6. It was assumed 
that this would give the pilot flying better awareness about 
the sensor that actually detected the windshear. Based on 
pilot comments from the 1993 experiment, the windshear 
label positions were reversed: reactive labels on the top of 
the PFD and forward-looking windshear labels on the 
bottom side of the PFD. 
An example of EFIS/NAV-presented windshear icons and 
the corresponding windshear labels on the PFD can be 
found in Figures 29. There three lidar-detected windshear 
cells (icons) are shown on the NAV-display (respectively 
Table 
Hazard 
Status 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
7 EFISINAV presented windshear icon colours 
enabling them to see if a of the relative and laser hazard status 
windshear threat had taken place. This concept will be 
referred to as speed feedback. It was expected that this 
visual feedback presented by display B would improve the 
overall situational awareness and thereby crew (pilot) 
decisions and that the number of go-arounds would be 
reduced. 
Icons in or infiinaing 
Zone A ?one B 
BLUE BLUE 
AMBER AMBER 
AMBER & 
RED 
RED RED 
coloured as red, amber and amberlred from bottom to top), 
of which the highest threat-level is given by a red icon very 
near to the aircraft. A red alert label presented on the lower 
part of the PFD corresponds to this threat-level. 
Simultaneously, the reactive system also shows the 
presence of a windshear, as indicated by the amber 
(caution) label. 
6.7 Speed increment procedure 
A speed increment flight procedure was set up and 
evaluated based on the 'cautious' penetrating windshear 
flight procedure that came out best from the 1993 
experiment. Altitude dependency was left out. Pilots did not 
have to interpret the alerts themselves anymore, since the 
procedure developed was coupled to the integrated, threat- 
level based, alerting concept. Whenever an aural alert was 
passed on to the cockpit, the pilot either applied a speed 
increment and continued the approach, or initiated a go- 
around in case of any red, i.e. level 4, alert. The speed 
additives belonging to hazard level 1, 2 or 3, were 
respectively 5, 15 or 20 kts, with respect to V,,=150 kts. 
Although human auditive memory is relatively long, a 
visual reminder was found necessary. Therefore, a blue 
flashing (lying V) symbol would appear on the speed tape 
(left side of the PFD) whenever a new speed setting was 
advised, to be set in the auto throttle window, see Fig 30. 
Lowering the (AT-window) speed would not be indicated, 
but was left free to the crews. 
6.8 \Vindshear icon displav concept 
Two diffcrcnt concepts of windshear icon displays were 
. . 
evaluated. The first concept (display A) displayed icons that 
were "static" in nature. "Static" here means that the icon 
colour would only vary as the windshear threat-level would 
change to a different level, but that colours would remain 
the same despite the speed increment(s) applied by the 
pilot. In the second concept (display B) the icon colours 
were adapted when an AT-speed increment was applied, 
through modification of the alert (and colour) thresholds. 
Crews would thus have a visual feedback of speed actions 
6.9 Experimental factors 
Some of the factors that were varied in the experiment, 
and that will be briefly addressed below, were: 
1) Look-ahead distance (Om I 1600m / 2400m) 
2) Display type (no icon display1 display A/ display B) 
3) Downburst strength (not extreme1 extreme) 
4) Downburst threat position (no threat1 threat) 
6.10 Preliminaq results 
So far, only a few initial results of crew workload can be 
shown. Workload was derived using the McDonnell '231 
"demand on the pilot" interval scale. The individual ratings 
from both the pilot flying and the PNF were combined into 
a total crew score. 
When analyzing runs without a windshear icon display 
(sub-experiment l), it turned out that downburst strength 
had a statistically significant effect on crew workload 
(F(2,40)=3.30; p<0.0471), see Fig.31. Especially for the 
extreme downburst severity, if no look-ahead sensor was 
available, crew workload was much higher than for the not 
extreme cases. For the latter, crew workload remained 
almost constant when adding a look-ahead sensor, since 
differences shown are statistically insignificant 
(F(2,40)=0.203; p<0.8172). For the extreme cases crew 
workload reduced significantly (F(2,40)=4.78; p<0.0138) 
with more forward-look range. 
First results from the second sub-experiment showed that 
adding the windshear icons to the NAV-display reduced 
crew workload significantly, see Fig.32. The reduction was 
almost totally due to the reduction in workload of the PF, 
since workload of the PNF remained the same, because of 
a much improved situational awareness. 
On the other hand, the application of the speed feedback 
mechanism increased crew workload. The speed feedback 
mechanisme 'forced' the crew to continue the approach 
towardslinto the shear. Especially with a display the 
interpretation of the varying colour of an icon as a result of 
the speed feedback concept caused an additional increase in 
mental workload. 
Fig. 33 presents results for downburst strengths categorized 
into 'extreme' and 'not extreme' cases. In the latter case 
crew workload reduced for icon display type A, but 
increased for display type B. For the extreme windshear 
cases (implying a crash would almost certainly occur, if 
flown through) adding display type A hardly changed crew 
workload, but it significantly decreased for display type B. 
-22- 
TF' 96592 
Regardless of this, display type A scored a lower (.e. 
better) crew workload. 
Icon position ('no threat' or 'threat') was statistically not 
significant, but the interaction with 'displays' and 'speed 
feedback' was (F(l,40)=21.07; p<0.0000). Results indicated 
a significant reduction (from 5.6 to 4.6) in crew workload 
for display A for the no threat cases. For the threatening 
icon positions, no significant differences in workload were 
found between both types of displays. 
Based on an analysis of questionnaire data from every run, 
pilots preferred display type B above type A. Nevertheless, 
from the debriefing results a minor (statistically non- 
significant) preference for display type A was found, see 
Fig.34. The reason for this was that display B tended to 
drive them to continue the approach towards a worsening 
(less safe and workload increasing) windsbear situation. 
Since they regarded a severe windshear as a once-in-a- 
lifetime experience, they would not object to make a go- 
around. 
6.11 Some pilot comments 
From pilots comments it was learned that the windshear 
icon display concept and the integated aural alerting 
mechanism were liked very well. However, the hazard level 
1 alert (and the 5 kts speed increment that had to be 
applied) was not found useful and therefore should be left 
out totally in the future. Presenting level 1 (blue) icons on 
the NAV-display was found acceptable. 
One crew disliked the use of the PFD label 
"WINDSHEAR in a situation where the flight would be 
continued with an increased speed. It should be reserved for 
the moment that immediate windshear awareness/action is 
required. 
According to most crews, the windshear icons improved 
situational awareness and contributed positively to an 
earlier decision making. Nevertheless icon sizes and colours 
changed too frequently and a more stable presentation was 
desired. 
Related to handling issues, most pilots commented they 
missed the possibility to perform (laser) tilt control, 
like that of a weather radar. 
Pilot opinions were not unanimous on the speed feed back 
concept and the usefulness of the (flashing) speed 
increment advisory symbol on the PFD speed tape. More 
comments on these (and other) issues involved will be 
published in the future. 
6.12 Concludine remarks 
Conclusions given should be regarded as preliminary. 
It can he concluded that presentation of windshear icon 
information, derived from forward-looking laserflidar 
sensors on the map-mode of an EFISM-d i sp l ay ,  is a 
very feasible concept. Icons improve the awareness of the 
windshear situation during the approach and reduces crew 
workload significantly. This beneficial effect was relatively 
stronger for display concept A (no speed feedback) than for 
display concept B (with speed feedback). The speed 
feedback mechanism increased crew workload, regardless 
of the presence of a display. 
When implementing a forward-looking windshear detection 
system in conjunction with a reactive system, a threat-level 
based aural alerting should be applied. Seen in the context 
that one should strive for the minimum necessary (extra) 
cockpit alerts, it can be concluded that the hazard level 1 
aural cues tested can be left out. However, displaying blue 
(hazard level 1) icons may be allowed. The sensor-based 
alert label presentation on the EFISIPFD was well received 
by the pilots, since awareness about which sensor provided 
an alert was found very important. 
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APPENDIX A: Probability calculations 
List of symbols 
Erf 
i 
"k 
Q 
SR, 
TSR 
X 
Y 
a 
P 
E 
P 
0 
Error function 
index 
number of variables on segment k 
value of error function 
Safety Risk on k' se-qent 
Total Safety Risk per run 
normal variable 
limit value of normal variable 
normalized upper boundary value for risk 
exceedance 
normalized lower boundary value for risk 
exceedance 
higher order error term 
mean value of normal variate 
standard deviation of normal variate 
A.l General probability calculations 
-
When calculating the probability of xi>aj, where xi is a 
normal variate, then this probability equals Qi(cl,), where 
Qi(ai) = Rob(% > ai) (A.1) 
where use is made of the error function 'Erf', which is 
based on the normal distribution. 
so that Qi(ai) can be calculated applying a standard method, 
see Abramowitz and Stegun (1964) 
Because of the symmetric distribution we also have: 
or: 
so that: 
or, in combination with Eq(A.1): 
Qi( - ail = 1 -Q.(a.) I I (A.6) 
In case of a double-sided probability of the form: 
Proh(P,<x,<a,) (A.7) 
the probability is split up in two parts, viz.: 
Prob(P,<xi<ai) = Prob(x,<cl,) + Prob(x,>Pi (A.8) = bi(k) - 481 (A.ll)  
For example, the touchdown distance should not be less ai(k) 
than -1000' or not be more than 3800', then this double- 
sided probability is split up in two probabilities, viz.: Here %(k) has a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. 
1. probability that x<-1000', or Values for yi(k) are given in Table A.1 for the flight 
2. probability that x>+3800'. segments and for the landing se-ment. 
To each of these probabilities the same methodology is The values of ~ ( k )  and q(k) were determined by the post- 
applied. processed se-ment statistics for the xi-th variable. 
For each variate xi involved in the flight or landing Table A.l Variables per se-ment for risk calculation 
probability the error function is applied. and limit values. 
The safety risk 'SR,' on the k' seapent (se,gnent 1"upper 
ILS", segment 2 "lower ILS", segment 3 "go-around", 
seapent 4 "landing") is the composite of all the 
contributions Q,=Q,(a,), according to Eq.(lOa) of the main 
text, applied repeatedly: 
where n, denotes the number of variates per se-ment. 
Since the higher error term E is very small this term has 
been deleted from the calculations. 
A table of variates per seapent is given in Table A.1. 
The total safety risk, 'TSR', per run is then calculated by 
summing the safety risk conmbutions from those segments 
which are involved in either the landing approaches or the 
go-around approaches, i.e.: 
TSR = 1 SR, for go-mounds on I* segment 
k=13 
or 
TSR = 1 SR, for go-mounds on 2"d segment 
k=1,2.3 
TSR = SR, for landing approaches (A. 1O.c) 
k=1,2,4 
Notes: 1) For segment definition, see page 6. 
A.2 Safety risk 2) 600 ftlmin in case of 8,,< 0 deg. 
- 
In order to calculate the probability of a variable to exceed - A.3 References 
some limit value yi(k) the function Q,(cq(k)) is used. A.1. Abramowitz, Stegun: "Handbook of mathematical 
The normalized limit value oc,(k) is calculated from the functions". National Bureau of Standards, 1964. 
limit value yi(k) for the k" segment using the mean k(k) 
and standard deviation cri(k) of the i" variable under 
question as follows: 
Fig.1 NLR's four degrees-of-freedom Research Flight Simulator. 
Fig.2 Research Flight Simulator Cockpit. 
This page is intentionally left blank 
Fig.3 Distribution of number of go-arounds 
LANDING APPROACHES 
Fig.4 Distribution of number of landing 
approaches 
Fig.5 Distribution of number of go-arounds 
and land~ngs 
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distance of go-around initiation relative 
to the TDP. 
RiGHT PROCEDURE mdn effect 
F(2.29)=+.23: p<.O244 Kmrkol-Walk test: H(2. N= 521 = 9.4899 p =.0087 
-1000 - 
................................ 
- 3-20ao 
k 
* 
= 
z 
L 
-,ooo 
r 
5 = z
- 
< ', L - + o o o  
0 \ 
+ 
Z 
B 
-SOOO 
......... " .. ....... 
WET" CAUTIOUS OmING I t 2  S.E. 
fiiGHT PROCEOURE s c m  CAUTIOUS OARING 
FLIGHT PROCEDURE 
Fig.8 Effect of flight procedure on type of 
go-around 
LOWER iLS SEGMENT 
I 
Krurkol-Woliis MOVA by Ronkr 
Krurkol-Wallis test: H(4. N- 52)  = 10.80504 p -0289 
+ MUUI 
I *2 S.E. 
NONE REACTNE USER TOWR MIX 
SENSOR PlPE 
Fig.9 Effect of sensors on type of go-around 
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Fig. 10 Contributors to flight safety risk 
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Fig. 12 Contributors to flight safety risk 
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Fig. 13 Contributors to landing safety risk 
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Fig. 14a Effect of windshear on flight safety 
during landing approaches 
Fig. 146 Effect of windshear on fli ht  safety 
dur~ng go-around approac a es 
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Fig. 15 Effect of windshear sensors on flight 
safety for landing approaches 
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Fig. 76a Effect of flight procedure on flight safety Fig. 17 Effect of approach type on flight safety 
for landing approaches risk and hazard factor 
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Fig. 7 6b Effect of flight procedure on flight safety Fig. 78 Effect of windshear type on landing safety 
for go-around approaches risk 
WINDSHEAR SENSOR moin effect 
F(4.66)=7.45: p<.0001 
FLIGHT PROCEDURE main effect 
F(2.66)=11.53: p<.0001 
Fig. 19 Effect of flight procedure on landing safety 
risk 
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Fig. 2 1 Effect of windshear sensor on landing 
safety risk 
WINDSHEbR N P E  moin effect 
F(2.104)=2.91: p<.0567 
Fig.20 Effect of crews, nested within fli ht Fig.22 Effect of windshear type on total safety 
procedures, on landing safety risf risk 
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Fig.23 Effect of crews on total safety risk 
Fig. 24 
WINOSHEliR SENSOR moin effect 
F(4.104)=1.92: p< . l lZJ  
NONE REliCTIVE iASER iOWR MIX 
WlNDSHEliR SENSOR 
Effect of windshear sensors on total safety 
risk 
BIGHT PROCEDURE moin effect 
Go-orounds: F(2.19)=2.35; p<.1220 
Londingr: F(2.69)=1 1.14: p~.0001 
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FLIGHT PROCEDURE 
Effect of  flight procedure on total safety 
risk 
APPROACH TYPE main effect 
iOTAL S4FETY RISK: F(1.117)=17.69: p,.0001 
FLiCHi SAFER RISK: i (1.1 17)=59.62: p<.0000 
LANDING GO-AROUND 
APPROACH TYPE 
Fig.26 Effect of approach type on totalsafety risk 
APPROACH TYPE main effect 
TOTAL SAFETY RISK: F(1.117)=12.24: p<.0007 
NGHT WEN RISK: F(1.117)=.3346: p<.564 
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Fig.27 Effect of  approach type on total safety 
risk; 
effect of airspeed in the go-around 
excluded 
Fig.28 Definition of hazard zones A and 6 
Fig.29 Navigation Display, showing three windshear icons. 
Fig.30 Primary Flight Display, showing windshear alert labels 
and speed advisory symbol. 
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2-way intemction 
F(2.40)=3.30: p<.0471 
Sub-experiment I 
3-,,y interaction 
F(1,40)=14.32: p<.0005 
Sub-experiment 2 (dry conditions) 
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Fig.31 Effect of forward-look distance on crew 
workload 
2-woy interaction 
F(1.40)=1.12 pc.2972 
Sub-experiment 2 (Dry conditions) 
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Fig.33 Effect of speed feedback and downbunt strength 
on crew workload 
DISPLAY moin effect 
F(2.22)=16.96: p<.OOOO 
Fig.32 Effect of display and speed feedback on crew 
workload 
